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In our 2017 International Affairs article, ‘Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime 
Security Studies’, we argued that it was time for international relations and security studies 
to pay more attention to the oceans.1 We suggested not only that more work should be 
done on the maritime space as an important site of international relations and security in 
and of itself, but also that there was a need to think from the sea as well as the land in 
understanding the place of the maritime in IR.  
 
We also suggested that many of the contemporary challenges of maritime security move 
beyond both realism’s traditional focus on seapower and geostrategy and liberalism’s focus 
on the norms and institutions of the law of the sea. These established approaches continue 
to offer important insights. Issues of geopolitical contestation at sea are of continuing and 
pressing relevance, as the 2019 Anglo-Iranian confrontation in the Gulf of Oman helps to 
illustrate, as are debates sounding the implementation and future of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and related international maritime laws and regulations. Even 
so, we argued, maritime security today incorporates a broader range of themes and 
 
1 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime 




challenges than traditional strategic studies or legal perspectives fully capture by on their 
own. In response, we called for a wider scholarly engagement with maritime security, in 
ways that take the sea as their starting point, that can capture the relationships and 
interconnections between issues, their spatial and epistemic characteristics, as well as the 
nature and evolution of maritime governance arrangements. 
 
 
Understanding maritime security  
 
The five papers in this special section are framed in the context of this new maritime 
security agenda. The ‘agenda’ in this sense refers to a cluster of security issues centred on 
the maritime domain. They incorporate the rise of a series of new, or at least reemergent 
disorders at sea. Of these, the growth and subsequent decline of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia from the mid-2000s onwards has attracted perhaps the most political, popular and 
academic attention.2 However, new political and security attention has also turned to other 
maritime themes in recent years. These include the continuing problem of piracy, 
particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and the Singapore and Malacca Straits;3 the threat of 
 
2 Christian Bueger, ‘Piracy studies: Academic responses to the return of an ancient menace’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 48: 3, 2014, pp. 404-16. 
3 Ali Kamal-Deen, ‘The anatomy of Gulf of Guinea piracy’, Naval War College Review, 68: 1, 
2015, pp. 93-118; Alexandra Alming et.al. Stable Seas: Sulu and Celebes Seas (Broomfield 




maritime terrorism4; hybrid warfare at sea, human trafficking and illegal migration in the 
Mediterranean and other places5; drug and arms trafficking by sea6; various other forms of 
trafficking and smuggling by sea7; fisheries crimes8; as well as intensified naval, geopolitical 
and legal competition at sea, in the South China Sea and elsewhere.9 In addition, new 
interest in the economic potential of the maritime environment has been stimulated by the 
increasing importance of so-called ‘blue growth’ strategies, as a component in the Global 
South in particular. Blue growth refers to use of the seas and marine resources for 
sustainable economic development, and so has relevance for economic security themes, but 
 
4 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism goes to sea’, Foreign Affairs, 83: 6, 2004, pp. 61-71. 
5 Eugenio Cusumano, ‘The sea as humanitarian space: Non-governmental Search and Rescue 
dilemmas on the Central Mediterranean migratory route’, Mediterranean Politics, 23: 3, 
2018, pp. 387-94. 
6 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Julie Høy-Carrasco. Navigating Changing Currents: A Forward-
Looking Evaluation of Efforts to Tackle Maritime Crime off the Horn of Africa (Copenhagen: 
University of Copenhagen, 2018), https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/navigating-
changing-currents/download-rapport/CMS_Rapport_2018__4_-
_Navigating_changing_currents__final__digital_19092018_.pdf  
7 Examples include wildlife and antiquities trafficking, amongst others.  
8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),  
Stretching the Fishnet: Identifying Opportunities to Address Fisheries Crime (Vienna: UNODC, 
2017).  
9 Felix K. Chang, ‘China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment’, 




also implies the need to protect such spaces from the kinds of maritime disorders and 
threats we identify above.  
 
Few of these issues are wholly ‘new’, in the sense that they have no antecedent or analogue 
in (often quite recent) history, as several of the papers in the special section help to 
illustrate. Even so, the contemporary maritime security agenda does present novelty in 
several important areas.  
 
First, the maritime security agenda is closely linked to the rise of global connectivities and 
contemporary capitalist circulation. As the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) notes, ‘[m]aritime transport is the backbone of international trade 
and the global economy’, with around 80 per cent of global trade volume and 70 per cent by 
value taking place at sea.10 The intensity and importance of globalised maritime trade thus 
creates new opportunities for predation, through piracy for instance, but also increases the 
global stakes when it occurs. Global connectivities facilitate many maritime security threats 
by creating new opportunities for criminal or terrorist financing, as well as global markets 
for illicit goods, as the example of the global drugs trade helps to illustrate.  
 
Secondly, and as Sarah Percy has argued, many of the challenges the maritime security 
agenda incorporates are not ‘traditional security issues, in the sense that they are often 
lower-order, unconventional threats… that straddle the border between crime and 
 





international security.’11 Indeed, and as Barry Ryan suggests in his contribution to this 
special section, responses to these issues imply ‘a mode of security that is focused on 
criminals more than enemies….’12 In this sense the rise of the maritime security agenda 
shares much with the earlier turn to non-traditional security themes on land, in that it 
expands the scope and nature of security at sea in both concept and practice, including 
issues of development, security and law enforcement, and the relationship between these 
themes. 
 
Finally, and until recently, the new maritime security agenda has received considerably less 
scholarly and practitioner attention than similar phenomena on land. It has, in short been 
an area of collective seablindness, both in international relations and security studies, but 
also amongst policy makers and practitioners too. Yet, arguably, the era of seablindness is 
over. The sea and maritime security issues are receiving gathering international attention. 
Recent maritime security debates in core (security) institutions such as the UN Security 
Council, the G7, NATO, the EU or the AU are telling indicators, as is the proliferation of 
maritime security strategies amongst different states and international organisations, 
increased operational activity, and capacity building activities. Also, scholarship across the 
social science spectrum is paying increasing attention to the sea, to the point where we 
 
11 Sarah Percy, ‘Counter-Piracy in the Indian Ocean: A New Form of Military Cooperation’, 
Journal of Global Security Studies, 1: 4, 2016, pp. 270-84. 
12 Barry J. Ryan, ‘A history of maritime security and zonation’, International Affairs, X: X, 




might even speak of a ‘blue turn’; that is a shift in perspective where thinking starts from 
the sea and not the land.   
 
Maritime security is an umbrella term that refers to a wider range of different security 
challenges at sea. In this sense, it functions as a buzzword that not only ‘define[s] what is in 
vogue’, but also links together a series of interconnected themes and issue areas in ways 
that recognise their diversity and unique features, but also broad provide a framework for 
analysis and action.13 How though can we articulate this framework in a way that both 
captures this diversity and but also provides an organising coherence to the issue at hand, 
for both scholars and practitioners?   
 
In our original ‘Beyond Seablindness’ paper and elsewhere, we argued that maritime 
security can be understood as a matrix comprising four main domains.14 The first of these is 
the national security domain. National security issues at sea largely correspond to the 
traditional concerns of sea-power, including disputes between states and naval competition. 
They may also include a range of other threats such as maritime terrorism or arms 
proliferation. A second domain addresses the marine environment. It incorporates issues 
associated with environmental security, including the protection of marine resources from 
activities such as illegal fishing or pollution, as well as marine challenges of climate change 
 
13 Andrea Cornwall, ‘Buzwords and fuzzwords: deconstructing development discourse’, 
Development in Practice, 17: 4/5, 2007, pp. 472, 474-5. 
14 Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness’, pp. 1299-300; Christian Bueger, ‘What is 




and biodiversity. Marine environment issues are closely linked to a third domain of 
economic development. This domain includes issues related to the blue economy and 
economic security, including the protection of global trade and the sustainable 
management and exploitation of marine resources. Finally, a human security domain 
encompasses those maritime insecurities experienced by individuals and local communities, 
whether those be as victims of human trafficking or kidnap piracy, or in consequence of the 
adverse effects of illegal fishing, marine pollution and so on.  
 
Contemporary maritime security issues share four distinguishing characteristics.15 The first 
of these is their interconnected and sometimes interdependent nature. Security issues in 
one domain may exacerbate challenges in another or have effects in multiple domains 
simultaneously. Thus, for example, and as Elizabeth DeSombre illustrates vividly in her 
contribution to this special section, illegal fishing can have pathological impacts on fish 
stocks, biodiversity, and the coastal communities who depend on these. In the case of 
Somalia, such pressures were one of the factors that stimulated the rise of piracy in the mid 
to late-2000s.16 Secondly, maritime security issues are liminal in the sense that they do not 
 
15 Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness’, pp. 1300-1. 
16 Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mahayni, ‘The dialectics of piracy in 
Somalia: the rich versus 
the poor’, Third World Quarterly 31: 8, 2010, pp. 1381–3; Sarah G. Phillips, ‘When less was 
more: external 





just take place at sea but implicate the land too. This may be because activities such as 
piracy or terrorism are organised, sustained and funded on land, but also because land-
based ‘root causes’ of development, exclusion and dislocation often underpin insecurities at 
sea. Third, maritime security is commonly transnational in nature, in that many of 
challenges it incorporates take place across or between national borders, or in regions of 
shared sovereignty such as the high seas. Finally, and by extension, maritime security is 
cross-jurisdictional, both in the sense of taking place in multiple sovereign territories, but 
also because it implicates a wide variety of institutions and organisational actors in 
addressing it, including navies, coastguards, port authorities, courts, prisons and many 
more.   
 
Maritime security is thus increasingly understood as an interlinked security complex of 
growing global, regional and national significance. The consequence has been a series of 
innovations in maritime security governance at sea as states and other maritime actors 
adapt and respond to what Barry Ryan calls ‘the turbulence of maritime politics.’17  
 
 
Introducing the special section 
 
In this special section, we present five papers that explore the bounds of the emergent 
maritime security agenda. Our first two papers explore the maritime security from 
traditional perspectives of geopolitics and the law of the sea.  
 





Aviad Rubin and Ehud Eiran from the University of Haifa examine the emergent geopolitical 
contours of maritime security in the Eastern Mediterranean. 18 One of the most striking 
features of their analysis is the end of seablindness in this region. The authors argue that 
states in the Eastern Mediterranean littoral increasingly turned their backs on the sea 
following the decline of the Ottoman empire and in the face of pressing political and 
security preoccupations on land. In recent years this has changed markedly however, driven 
by three main developments. The first of these has been the discovery of significant oil and 
gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, a region characterised by complex and 
contested maritime boundaries. The second has been an increase in political instability in 
the region in consequence of the so-called Arab Spring, and the associated migrant crisis 
that has in large part stemmed from or been facilitated by this. Finally, the past decade has 
also seen the entry of new or newly resurgent maritime powers into the Eastern 
Mediterranean arena in the form of Russia and China. 
 
Rubin and Eiran’s paper highlights that traditional security issues at sea have not gone away. 
Geopolitical tensions and the race to secure maritime resources have led to significant 
programmes of naval acquisition amongst states in the region. At the same time, claims to 
maritime territory and disputes over existing boundaries have taken on a new urgency 
as regional states scramble to secure access to oil and gas reserves beneath the 
seabed. While the authors acknowledge some early signs of multiparty cooperation in the 
 
18 Aviad Rubin and Ehud Eiran, ‘The Eastern Mediterranean: towards a coordinated 




Eastern Mediterranean basin, especially over the extraction and transportation of offshore 
gas, they argue that, so far, the limited nature of this cooperation fails to lead to the way to 
regional-scale maritime security. One reason for this seeming failure is the lack of shared 
identity and set of values among the region’s members. The other impediment to the 
development of regional maritime security is the existence of enduring feuds between 
political units in the region, and lack of sovereignty in others, which stand in the way of 
comprehensive cooperation at sea, despite an urgent need to do so. 
  
Douglas Guilfoyle from University of New South Wales Canberra turns to the question of 
‘lawfare’ in the South China Sea.19 He considers the ways in which the Law of the Sea may 
interact with and condition key elements of the maritime security agenda. Focusing on the 
South China Sea, his paper highlights the continuing salience of traditional security 
challenges in the maritime arena and the use of law to as a tool of struggle and means of 
consolidating gains. These dynamics of inter-state competition have taken on novel forms 
that move beyond naval confrontation. In particular, and in common with Rubin and Eiran, 
he highlights the key role of maritime resources, and by extension blue economy issues, in 
driving geopolitical tensions in the region. Significantly, these include not only undersea oil 
and gas reserves, but also fisheries as a key fulcrum of competition. 
 
Guilfoyle’s analysis has other implications too. In particular, he shows how innovations in 
states’ maritime security practices can be disruptive as well as collaborative in nature. 
 
19 Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘The rule of law and maritime security: understanding lawfare in the 




China’s strategy of island building in the South China Sea represents one such form of 
disruptive innovation. It has been accompanied by a concerted effort on the part of the 
Chinese state to deploy legal resources to challenge and unsettle the existing legal order at 
sea. For Guilfoyle, this Chinese maritime ‘lawfare’ is itself a site of strategic struggle. First, it 
is a key means by which China seeks to legitimate its maritime territorial claims, allowing it 
to consolidate its material gains on the ground. Second however, it lays down a  marker, and 
so ‘open up spaces in which it can act as a norm entrepreneur [in the evolution of the law of 
the sea] and consolidate its “rightful” regional position’ over the longer term.20 Guilfoyle 
cautions, however, that while China’s arguments are in some respects opportunistic and 
ahistorical, they are not necessarily insincere. As he shows, they have roots in Chinese 
attitudes to the law of the sea going back to at least the negotiation of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Seas in the 1970s. 
 
Elizabeth DeSombre from Wellesley College traces the security implications of fisheries, 
examining how different dimensions of security interact around this critical node of 
maritime activity.21 DeSombre’s paper examines four main security themes associated with 
fisheries. The first, which parallels some of Guilfoyle’s analysis of developments in the South 
China Sea, concerns conflicts over the small islands and access to the fisheries resources 
associated with them. The second draws out the role of fisheries (and their exploitation and 
depletion) in creating or exacerbating other maritime security challenges; in this case the 
 
20 Guilfoyle, ‘The rule of law’, p. X.  
21 Elizabeth DeSombre, ‘The security implications of fisheries’, International Affairs, XX: X, 




rise of Somalia piracy. The third theme comprises so-called ‘fish wars’ in the sense of inter-
state conflicts and confrontations over fisheries resources, with a focus on the Anglo 
Icelandic Cod Wars and the Turbot War between Canada and Spain. Finally, she looks at the 
human security implications of fisheries, concentrating particularly on the use of forced 
labour and slavery or slavery-like conditions on some fishing boats at sea.  
 
DeSombre’s work highlights a number of important themes for maritime security. First, she 
shows the importance of thinking from the sea rather than land. Small islands (and small 
island states) may have a tiny terrestrial surface area, but their maritime territories and 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) can be very large indeed. This has led some to use the term 
‘large ocean states’ to describe such places.22 Second, her analysis clearly illustrates the 
multidimensional, interconnected and liminal nature of many maritime security challenges. 
Fisheries incorporate themes of national security (including inter-state conflict), marine 
environment, economic development, and human security issues, as well as the way in 
which such issues may interact with each other and with circumstances on land. Finally, her 
paper suggests that while conflicts over fisheries may sometimes be associated with 
traditional inter-state disputes over contested maritime territories (as with the Cod Wars), 
the dynamics of more recently conflicts are often more complex and nuanced and 
concerned the collective governance of shared resources at sea.  
 
 
22 Nicholas Chan, ‘“Large Ocean States”: Sovereignty, small islands, and Marine Protected 




Katja Lindskov Jacobsen from the University of Copenhagen and Jessica Larsen from the 
Danish Institute for International Studies pick up these themes to examine collective 
maritime security governance in counter-piracy operations.23 They focus on how responses 
to piracy in the Western Indian Ocean have worked to fashion and sustain novel 
constellations of actors and activities that have persisted even after the threat of piracy in 
the region has itself receded. The paper argues that, in addition to themes of 
interconnectedness, liminality, transnationality and cross-jurisdictionally, maritime security 
is also characterised by contingency. As the authors note ‘[t]he seas, while not an 
unregulated domain, are subject to different conditions: the oceans are communal, rather 
than divided among sovereign states, and states enjoy flexibility in the exercise of their 
jurisdiction and are subject to limitations on their sovereign rights.’24 These conditions of 
contingency mean that the seas offer ‘a pronounced potential for reordering new and old 
actors in the maritime domain’.25  
  
In large part because of this contingency, counter-piracy operations in the Western Indian 
Ocean have functioned as crucible of innovation for maritime security governance. Jacobsen 
and Larsen show how such responses have led to novel constellations of actors coordinating 
and working together around a common counter-piracy goal, as well as creative solutions to 
problems such as how to effectively prosecute those pirates that are captured at sea. 
 
23 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Jessica Larsen, ‘Piracy studies coming of age: a window on 
the making of maritime security actors’, International Affairs, XX: XX, pp. XX-XX.  
24 Jacobsen and Larsen, ‘Piracy studies’, p. X.  




However, they also argue that these responses are not just important because of the (quite 
successful) ‘problem effects’ they have had in addressing the Somali piracy issue itself. They 
have also had constituative effects, in the sense that such responses have themselves led to 
the creation of new security governance mechanisms and forms of order at sea. These in 
turn have endured beyond the decline or containment of the immediate piracy problem and 
now function to structure and organise collective maritime security responses more 
generally in the region as a whole. 
 
In our final paper, Barry Ryan from Keele University also looks at the constitutive effects of 
maritime security governance activities.26  He offers a perspective from history and critical 
geography to show how processes of zoning at sea have worked to fashion specific maritime 
security responses and shape an evolving redistribution of spatial order at sea. Ryan’s paper 
points out that the concepts of dominium and imperium traditionally framed our 
understanding of seaspace. While imperium framed the sea as a risky and ungovernable 
space that required military strength to control, the discourse of dominium imagined that 
the littoral state could extend land-based sovereignty into maritime space. Ryan points to a 
critical shift in the 18th century when a more globalist security-based conception of the sea 
begins to transcend this traditional binary. This leads to zones at sea that are constructed 
not around the discourse of sovereignty and power, but around practices amenable to the 
management of resources and the enforcement of order. For Ryan the zonal regime created 
 




by UNCLOS in 1982 consolidated this security-oriented approach to maritime governance in 
what he calls the ‘the Westphalian moment for the world maritime sphere.’ 27   
 
Ryan further argues for this reason the discourse and practices of states utilising the sea to 
exercise power must always cohere with a global maritime security agenda, referencing the 
environment, terrorism, illegal fishing, smuggling pollution and so on. Ryan observes that 
since UNCLOS the politics of maritime security has emerged from an intensification and 
extensification of zonation at sea. The EEZ has become an intensified site of marine 
surveillance and policing, characterised by the rise of the maritime security agenda itself. At 
the same time, zonification has extensified through a series of further maritime security 
initiatives – such as the establishment of high risk areas for shipping in the face of Somali 
piracy and the increasing development of large scale marine protected areas. For Ryan, 
therefore, the rise of the maritime security agenda has implications not just for the 
management and amelioration of the new maritime insecurities, nor simply the constitution 
of new security governance mechanisms at sea, but in relation to a wider and deeper 





27 Ryan, ‘The disciplined sea’, p. X.  
